Safety analysis by Knight, John C.
N96-10033
SAFETY ANALYSIS
John C. Knight
Department of Computer Science, University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22903
Case Studies
We are engaged in a research program in safety-critical
computing that is based on two case studies. We use these
case studies to provide application-specific details of the
various research issues, and as targets for evaluation of
research ideas.
The first case study is the "Magnetic Stereotaxis System
(MSS), an investigational device for performing human
neurosurgery being developed in a joint effort between the
Department of Physics at the University of V'trginia and the
Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Iowa.
The system operates by manipulating a small permanent
magnet (known as a "seed") within the brain using an exter-
nally applied magnetic field. By varying the magnitude and
gradient of the external magnetic field, the seed can be
moved along a non-linear path and positioned at a site
requiring therapy, e.g., a tumor. The magnetic field required
for movement through brain tissue is extremely high, and is
generated by a set of six superconducting magnets located
in a housing surrounding the patient's head. The system
uses two X-ray cameras positioned at right angles to detect
in real time the locations of the seed and of X-ray opaque
markers affixed to the patient's skull. The X-ray images are
used to locate the objects of interest in a canonical frame of
reference.
The second case study is the University of Virginia
Research Nuclear Reactor (UVAR). It is a 2 MW thermal,
concrete-walled pool reactor. The system operates using 20
to 25 plate-type fuel assemblies placed on a rectangular grid
plate. There are three scramable safety rods, and one non-
scramable regulating rod that can be put in automatic mode.
It was originally constructed in 1959 as a 1 MW system,
and it was upgraded to 2 MW in 1973. Though only a
research reactor rather than a power reactor, the issues
raised are significant and can be related to the problems
faced by full-scale reactor systems.
Safety Kernel
The software in systems like those in our case studies is
very large and complex. We assume that, because of this
size and complexity, faults will remain in the software for
an application after development. An approach we are pur-
suing to deal with this is a software architecture termed a
safety kernel, a concept directly analogous to the security
kernel used in security applications.
A security kernel provides assurance that a set of security
policies is enforced independently of the application pro-
gram. Verification of the security kernel is sufficient to
ensure enforcement of those policies encapsulated within
the security kernel. The application program need not
enforce the security policies, and it can, in fact, undertake
actions that would normally lead to violation of the security
policies with no danger of actual violations taking place.
The similarity between security concerns and safety con-
cerns is considerable and the concept of a safety kernel is
appealing. If the concept were feasible, a safety kernel
would enforce a set of safety policies by monitoring
requests to devices, device actions, device status, applica-
tion software status, and so on.
We have developed an enforcement safety kemel and inte-
grated it into our MSS implementation. The safety kernel is
generated automatically from a formal specification of the
safety policies, and tests of the MSS instantiation show
excellent performance.
Testing
Systems of this complexity pose significant challenges in
the area of testing, especially in the large number of possi-
ble test cases. We are using a technique that we call specifi-
cation limitation to permit demonstration of useful
properties by exhaustive testing. By specification limitation
we mean that the specification for the application is deliber-
ately limited in several areas to restrict the total number of
test cases. For example, in the MSS the angles entered by
the operator for the required direction of motion are
rounded to 1/10 of a degree. In practice, this is not a signifi-
cant functional restriction but it permits exhaustive testing
of the angles used for setting direction. The same approach
is used with distance.
A second significant problem in testing complex systems is
correctness determination, i.e., determining whether the
outputs are correct. In our MSS implementation, we have
addressed this problem by the use of reversal checks on the
entire system. A reversal check computes a program's input
from its output and compares this with the actual input. The
current calculations for the superconducting coils, for
example, begin with a required force and are very complex.
Computing the force resulting from the coil currents, how-
ever, is simple and provides the exact inverse of the current
calculations. Thus the input can be computed and com-
pared. A variation on the idea of a reversal check is also
used by the MSS imaging subsystem.
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